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Policies towards Horizontal Inequalities 







The design of policies towards countries where major conflicts have ended is becoming 
a major issue in the development agenda partly because of the numbers of countries 
where such policy is relevant and partly because their situation tends to be among the 
most desperate. This paper is concerned with one major requirement in reconstruction 
policies that is often overlooked: that is to design policies which will reduce the 
horizontal inequalities which are often a major source of conflict. If they do not, there 
will be a danger of renewed mobilization around them and a further outbreak of 
violence. The paper reviews the range of policies which would contribute to reducing 
horizontal inequalities. It also considers some political issues surrounding such policies, 
including potential political risks which can arise in adopting these types of policy. 
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The design of policies towards countries where major conflicts have ended is becoming 
a major issue in the development agenda partly because of the numbers of countries 
where such policy is relevant and partly because their situation tends to be among the 
most desperate. Today, for example, we have the Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Congo 
nearing the post-conflict stage, adding to the conflicts that ended with the end of the 
cold war, such as El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Mozambique, and Angola. As is 
apparent from this list not all the conflicts have ended completely, and there is always a 
danger of recurrence.1 In designing policy, therefore, it is essential to address the main 
factors that led to the conflict in the first place, as well as the more obvious 
requirements of demobilization, reconstructing the infrastructure and re-establishing 
conditions for economic growth.  
 
This paper is concerned with one major requirement in reconstruction policies that is 
often overlooked: that is to design policies which will reduce the horizontal inequalities 
(HIs) which are often a major source of conflict. If they do not, and HIs are an 
important element behind mobilization for conflict, there will be a danger of renewed 
mobilization around them and a further outbreak of violence. The paper reviews the 
range of policies which would contribute to reducing HIs; it also considers some 
political issues surrounding such policies, including potential political risks which can 
arise in adopting these types of policy.  
 
There are many economic and political causes of violent conflict—low incomes, high 
unemployment, and competition for resources, human rights abuses, etc.—some 
associated with horizontal inequalities, some not. Before appropriate reconstruction 
policies can be designed it is essential to understand the deep-rooted reasons for the 
conflict, which in many cases will go beyond HIs, and in some cases may not involve 
HIs at all. Thus the policies aimed at reducing HIs are not the only policies needed post-
conflict, and are not invariably relevant. The policies to be discussed below are relevant 
to situations where HIs are large and have been a significant factor underlying the 
conflict.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section will explore how HIs can contribute 
to conflict. On the basis of this analysis section 3 will consider the types of policies 
likely to reduce HIs. Section 4 will analyse how some of these policies have worked in 
practice, some successes and some problems. In section 5, we then consider how far 
such policies are currently incorporated in the reconstruction policy agenda, both on the 
                                                 
1 Econometric analysis of the causes of wars, invariably finds that the most consistent predictor of 
conflict in any country is having had a previous conflict. See, e.g. Auvinen and Nafziger (1999).   
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basis of some general pronouncements and two examples—Mozambique and 
Guatemala. Section 6 will conclude. 
2  Causes of conflict: the role of HIs 
Horizontal inequalities are inequalities among groups with shared identities—identities 
formed by religion, ethnic ties or racial affiliations, or other salient ways that bind 
groups of people together. While many conflicts have a cultural dimension, i.e. the 
groups that fight perceive themselves as belonging to a common culture (ethnicity or 
religion) and are partly fighting for cultural autonomy, it is evident that cultural 
differences are not a sufficient explanation for conflict since many multicultural 
societies live together relatively peacefully, while others do so for decades and then 
conflict erupts. Indeed, Fearon and Laitin have estimated that from 1960-79 of all the 
potential ethnic conflicts in Africa (defined as occurring where different ethnic groups 
live side-by-side) only 0.01 per cent actually turned into conflict. We need, therefore, to 
go beyond cultural explanations of conflict to economic and political explanations. As 
Abner Cohen (1974: 94) argued:  
Men may and do certainly joke about or ridicule the strange and bizarre 
customs of men from other ethnic groups, because these customs are 
different from their own. But they do not fight over such differences 
alone. When men do … fight across ethnic lines it is nearly always the 
case that they fight over some fundamental issues concerning the 
distribution and exercise of power, whether economic, political, or both.  
 
That is, cultural differences do not lead to violent conflict unless there are also major 
economic and/or political causes. The motivation of the participants is clearly at the 
heart of the roots of any violent situation. Many contemporary economists emphasize 
the pursuit of individual economic advantage as the prime force. But the majority of 
internal conflicts are organized group conflicts, not exclusively, or mainly, a matter of 
individuals committing random violence against others. What is involved is group 
mobilization with people with some shared identity or goals attacking others, in the 
name of the group.  While young men may fight because they are unemployed and 
uneducated and have few other opportunities, they also generally fight out of loyalty to 
a group (sometimes an ideology or a cause) , like the militia in Najaf, the Hutus in 
Rwanda, the Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Catholics in Northern Ireland and so on. 
Sometimes, indeed, the power of their beliefs or loyalties are so high that they are 
prepared to sacrifice their own interests—in the extreme including their lives—for the 
wider objectives of the group. Often governments are involved, dominated by one or 
other identity group, sometimes instigating attacks against other groups, sometimes  
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being attacked.2 In fact Holsti argues that state violence has more often than not been 
the initiating cause in recent conflicts (Holsti 2000). 
 
In contemporary conflicts, group affiliations occur along a variety of different lines. In 
some, it is religious affiliation that provides the relevant binding and categorising 
identity (Northern Ireland; Moslems/Hindus in India, the Philippines, for example); in 
some it seems to be racial (Fiji; Darfur); in some it is ethnicity (Rwanda; North East 
India); in some clans are the main source of affiliation (e.g., Somalia) and in many there 
are overlapping distinctions, for example both ethnic and religious affiliations (as in Jos 
in Nigeria; and the Balkans), while class and ethnicity overlap in Central America and 
caste and ethnicity in Nepal. The salience of such identities for political purposes 
develops either where leaders choose to emphasize group difference for mobilization for 
political ends (for example, the Malaysian government choosing to emphasize 
Bumiputera identity; or indigenous movements in Ecuador and Bolivia) and/or the 
group is picked out by others for discrimination and sometimes physical violence (for 
example, the Jews throughout history; the Chinese in South East Asia; Northerners in 
Côte d’Ivoire). 
 
Though group boundaries are generally indeterminate and people have multiple and 
fluid identities, leaders are able to emphasize (or even create) particular affiliations and 
call on these identities in mobilizing supporters. However, effective large scale group 
mobilization—particularly for violent actions—generally requires a basis in serious 
group grievances and ambitions. For leaders of such groups the main motivation may be 
political ambition; while followers, who also are concerned with their political 
representation, may be primarily motivated by grievance about the economic and social 
position of the group relative to others. Both leaders and followers may become strongly 
motivated where there are severe and consistent economic, social and political 
differences between culturally defined groups, or multidimensional HIs. It should be 
noted that it is not necessarily the relatively deprived who instigate violence. The 
privileged may do so, fearing loss of position. The prospect of possible loss of political 
power can act as a powerful motive for state-sponsored violence which occurs with the 
aim of suppressing opposition and maintaining power.  
 
For simplification, we can categorize HIs into four areas: political participation; 
economic assets; incomes and employment; and social aspects. Each of these contain a 
number of elements. For example, political participation can occur at the level of the 
cabinet, the bureaucracy, the army and so on; economic assets comprise land, livestock, 
human capital etc. The four categories and the main elements are presented Table 1, 
which provides examples where particular HIs seem to have been instrumental in 
                                                 
2 It is often unclear which group initiated the action, but in reactions groups (including governments) can 
enhance and spiral the conflict, or can act to moderate or eliminate it. In many of the worst conflicts, 
governments are responsible for a spiralling effect (e.g. Guatemala; Aceh).  
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provoking conflict. Relevant economic HIs vary according to the nature of the 
economy; e.g., land may be irrelevant in modern urban societies, but is clearly of 
paramount importance in Zimbabwe; access to employment and housing form 
significant HIs in developed economies, such as Northern Ireland; in rentier economies, 
control over such resources, directly or via the state, becomes an important source of 
group competition.  
Table 1: Some examples of horizontal inequality in conflict situations 
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Source: See text. 
HIs may be spatially distributed—i.e., particular regions of a country are deprived (or 
privileged). In this case, HIs can lead to separatist claims—sometimes richer provinces 
seek separatism, not wanting to share their wealth (e.g., Biafra in Nigeria, or Aceh in 
Indonesia), and sometimes it is poorer regions, who feel exploited by the richer areas 
(e.g., Bangladesh and Eritrea). Different types of conflict emerge, however, where  
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people from salient groups live in the same geographic area. In such cases, the deprived 
may seek political and economic rights or control over governmental institutions, or 
there can be attacks among groups without direct government involvement and pressure 
for ethnic cleansing. Appropriate policies differ in these different situations.  
 
It is important to recognize that the normal economic policy package of liberalization 
and market forces is not generally sufficient to reduce HIs, or even to prevent them 
widening, while democratic institutions are often not sufficient to prevent horizontal 
inequalities arising on the political dimension. As far as economic HIs are concerned, 
this is because long-lasting privilege among some groups relative to others, puts them in 
a stronger position (with better education, more capital, etc.) to exploit the market. As 
far as political HIs are concerned, majoritarian democracies can discriminate against 
minorities, while even with ‘shared’ power at the top, inequalities may persist at lower 
levels. Inequalities in political power often lead to similar inequalities in economic and 
social dimensions. Biased distribution of government jobs, infrastructure and so on is 
common, with the group in power discriminating in its favour. For example, in Burundi 
in the 1990s, half of government investment went to Bujumbura and its vicinity, home 
of the elite Tutsi (Gaffney 2000). In some countries, the President and his coterie take a 
massive share of state resources for their private use—as, for example, the Duvaliers in 
Haiti and the Somoza family in Nicaragua (Lundahl 2000; Pastor and Boyce 2000). 
Research to date3 suggests that HIs are more likely to provoke conflict when: 
 
−  They are durable (Tilly 1998). Clearly, temporary inequalities are much less 
provocative. According to Tilly, durability arises from groups trying to preserve 
their privileges, via exploitation and hoarding. Cumulative advantage is another 
cause of durability—for example, if a group has an advantage in income it is able 
to gain advantages in assets and earnings, which can lead to further educational 
advantages. 
−  Where HIs are not only sustained but widening over time. 
−  Group boundaries are relatively impermeable. If there is easy mobility across 
group boundaries, then inequalities can be overcome, at the individual level if not 
the group level, by changing identities.  
−  There are fairly large numbers in different groups. If the underprivileged group is 
very small, the chances of success through conflict may also be small (or the 
conflict can be easily suppressed) which makes serious conflict less likely. An 
important question concerns what numerical distribution of groups makes conflict 
most likely. Large numbers of small groups rarely are conflictual since no one 
group dominates and the small groups may develop peaceful coalitions. The 
coexistence of a large less economically privileged group with a significant but 
much smaller privileged group seems to provoke conflict, often initiated by the 
                                                 
3 In work at CRISE: see crise.ox.ac.uk  
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larger group (examples are the Jews in Europe, the Chinese in South East Asia, the 
Tutsis in Africa, the Tamils in Sri Lanka.);4  
−  HIs are consistent across dimensions. As noted, groups may be more inclined to 
rebel where there is lack of political power combined with economic deprivation. 
Political cooption of leaders can sustain peaceful coexistence even in the presence 
of strong economic HIs, as seems to have happened in Bolivia; 
−  Where aggregate incomes are stagnant or slow growing so that there is little or no 
improvement in absolute economic and social position of the deprived;  
−  Where groups are sufficiently cohesive for collective action to emerge; 
−  Where leaders emerge and are not co-opted into the ruling system; this is 
particularly likely to be the case where there are political HIs (or political 
exclusion of some groups); and  
−  Where the government is irresponsive (or, worse, proactively and violently 
repressive) and consequently there is no redress through peaceful means. 
HIs are not, of course, the sole source of conflict.5 Other economic explanations of 
conflict include private incentives, arising particularly in the presence of natural 
resources where war provides opportunities of enrichment; individual grievances of 
various kind, particularly associated with low incomes, and high levels of poverty and 
unemployment; environmental pressures leading to conflicts over resources, especially 
land; and failure of the social contract to deliver public services, security and incomes. 
Each of these explanations has some statistical and case study support. Different 
conflicts have different explanations, while more than one hypothesis often appears to 
be relevant. For example, the north/south conflict in the Sudan was both an example of 
horizontal inequality (with the south being heavily deprived), and one of powerful 
private gains which perpetuated the struggle (Keen 1994). While environmental poverty 
has plausibly been argued to be a significant element in the conflict in Rwanda (André 
and Platteau 1996), horizontal inequalities were clearly also important.  
 
Where HIs are a primary factor behind conflict, it is important to identify which of the 
many elements in HIs were critical. Hence one cannot devise a one size fits all solution. 
What one can do is to develop a general approach—to investigate and assess major HIs 
in all the three main dimensions, and then to develop suitable policies. Our research to 
date suggests that economic and social HIs represent a predisposing condition, such that 
deprived groups have strong grievances, but the simultaneous presence of major 
                                                 
4 These are the groups that Chua describes as ‘market dominant minorities’ (Chua 2003). 
5 See Collier (2000); Homer-Dixon (1994); Nafziger and Auvinen (2002).  
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political HIs makes violent conflict much more likely.6 Consequently, policies must 
address political as well as economic/social HIs.  
The next section will review the sort of policies which would reduce HIs, with some 
examples of places where they have been applied. We look first at policies towards 
economic/social HIs and then at policies towards political HIs. 
3  Policies towards HIs 
Policies towards correcting HIs can be interpreted as a form of affirmative action. This 
is action taken towards the allocation of political and/or economic entitlements on the 
basis of membership of specific groups, for the purpose of increasing the specified 
groups’ share of entitlements. The action generally covers the public sector and 
sometimes extends to private sector activity. Such action is directed at relatively 
disadvantaged groups. Similar action designed to improve the position of privileged 
groups (e.g., under apartheid) would be described as exclusionary rather than 
affirmative.  
 
In devising policies, the first requirement is careful diagnosis to identify whether HIs 
were indeed a factor in the conflict, and which elements were particularly salient. It is 
essential, therefore, to gather data on groups’ position, with respect to the major 
economic and political dimensions outlined above. In practice, data of this type is 
relatively rare except in countries where the importance of HIs is acknowledged and 
policies are being adopted towards them, such as in Malaysia or South Africa. In many 
cases, proxies will have to be used (geographic data is the most obvious proxy in cases 
where the groups are geographically located, but this, of course, won’t help where there 
is geographic mixing). One important consideration is to avoid a situation in which the 
policies devised to correct HIs become a source of conflict as they arguably did in Sri 
Lanka. This issue will be discussed in the concluding section. Here I separate 
economic/social and political action towards HIs. 
3.1  Economic and social policies towards HIs 
Here the objective is to reduce economic and social HIs. But it is not always 
straightforward to decide what this means. For example: should one aim for equality of 
opportunities, of resource access or of outcomes? In the first case one would aim for ‘an 
even playing field’, i.e. that everyone faces the same opportunities, or there is no group 
discrimination. But this is not simple to define since groups with deep disadvantages 
which have accumulated over time are unable to use opportunities with the same 
efficiency and outcomes: for example, without any overt discrimination, the children of 
long-term privileged groups will do better in any competitive examinations, and so on. 
                                                 
6 This is well illustrated in recent developments in Cote d’Ivoire (see Langer 2005).  
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Moreover, disadvantage has many aspects, some of which are quite hidden, e.g., job 
advertisements may be in newspapers which in principle are open to all but in practice 
are widely read by one group rather than another. Social networks and information 
about education, jobs, economic opportunities are often strongly group related, so what 
seems like a ‘level playing field’ is not. All sorts of implicit practices and job 
requirements (e.g., on language, time and place for job applications and so on) may 
favour one group against another. Therefore, the liberal philosophy of ‘equal 
opportunities’ is at best a necessary condition for advancing group equality. Another 
way of looking at this is to say that in addition to eliminating overt discrimination there 
is much implicit discrimination that must be addressed.  
 
Equality of resource access—interpreted as equality of actual resource distribution, not 
‘opportunities’—is likely to get nearer to providing a genuine level playing field. This 
may still result in inequalities of outcomes, defined very broadly in terms of health, 
income per capita and educational achievements,7 because the disadvantaged group is 
likely to be less efficient at using a particular set of assets in part because some assets 
are difficult to target, especially in the short-run, and are likely to remain unequal, such 
as features associated with upbringing, social capital etc. Hence for equality of 
outcomes one may need inequality in access to targetable assets, such as education, 
land, and capital. However, in most contexts large HIs prevail and as a first step 
achieving greater equality of actual asset access would represent important progress. 
Further policies to achieve equality of outcomes can follow in later years if asset 
equality has been achieved and inequality of outcomes persists.  
 
One can distinguish three types of policy which may be adopted to achieve greater 
group equality in economic entitlements (although the distinctions are not watertight). 
First, one can change policies towards processes which are directly or indirectly 
discriminatory. Second, one can direct assistance to particular groups, e.g., training 
people for interviews, subsidising housing. Third, one can introduce targets and quotas 
for education, land distribution, financial and physical assets etc. The first type of policy 
is not so different from any set of policies to promote competition—although it involves 
a much more careful search for indirectly discriminatory policies than is usual. It is 
likely to be the most acceptable type of policy and can have a significant impact (this 
was a major part of the policy set adopted in Northern Ireland, see below). However, 
post-conflict reconstruction generally requires immediate action and impact, while 
process reform takes a while to have a significant impact. The second type of policy 
concerns the nature and distribution of public expenditure, often involving a redirection 
of expenditure across regions, or even neighbourhoods, as well as groups within them, 
                                                 
7 Equality of outcomes can be difficult to define: one surely does not want to aim for exact equality in 
every outcome (e.g. equal proportions of footballers, doctors, university professors, and so on, in relation 
to group numbers). Yet a racial or ethnic division of labour is at the root of many HIs so one does need to 
aim for some balance in representation in occupations, very broadly defined.   
  9
and is in principle in the control of the government, but it may meet resistance from 
privileged areas or from the government itself representing privileged groups. This type 
of policy requires careful review of the implications of all public expenditure (and other 
relevant policies) for group distribution of benefits. It is noteworthy that this does not 
form an explicit consideration in the public expenditure reviews supported by the 
international donors, or that of most governments. The third type of policy (quotas, etc.) 
is most controversial and politically provocative. The third type is what many people 
mean when they talk of ‘affirmative action’ though affirmative action can be interpreted 
as including all three types of policy. 
 
Where a major source of HIs is the public sector (education, employment, 
infrastructure) a good deal can be achieved through direct action by the government, if 
it wants to reduce HIs. HIs located in the private sector are more difficult to tackle, 
though all three types of policy will make a contribution. 
 
Despite the fact that affirmative action (especially of the third type) smacks of 
government intervention and would, therefore, be against the spirit of the pro-market 
liberalization that dominates current policy making, there are many cases where it has 
been adopted in one way or another. These cases are instructive both for pointing to the 
variety of policies possible and some of their effects. Appendix Table A.1 summarizes a 
review of affirmative action in economic and social policies around the world showing 
how pervasive it is (see Appendix Table A1). The focus on the review was the third 
type (quotas, etc.) because these are most overt, although examples of other types were 
included. Such policies have been adopted both in the North (the USA, New Zealand, 
Northern Ireland) and the South (e.g., Fiji, India, Malaysia, South Africa and Sri 
Lanka).  
 
The programmes reviewed are of two sorts: those introduced by disadvantaged 
majorities (e.g., Fiji, Malaysia, Namibia, South Africa and Sri Lanka) and those 
introduced by advantaged majorities for disadvantaged minorities (e.g., Brazil, India, 
Northern Ireland and the USA). The review of affirmative action, which I would not 
claim to be comprehensive, but does cover many examples, points to the range of 
potential policies for correcting HIs. They include policies towards:  
 
Assets 
—  Policies to improve the group ownership of land via redistribution of 
government owned-land; forcible eviction; purchases; restrictions on 
ownership. Examples are from Malaysia; Zimbabwe; Fiji; Namibia; 
—  Policies towards the terms of privatization (Fiji); 
—  Financial assets: bank regulations; subsidization; restrictions (Malaysia; South 
Africa); 
—  Credit allocation preferences (Fiji; Malaysia);  
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—  Preferential training (Brazil, New Zealand); 
—  Quotas for education (Malaysia, Sri Lanka, US); 
—  Public sector infrastructure (South Africa); 
—  Housing (Northern Ireland); 
—  In principle one might also have (though no examples were identified) policies 
to improve social capital (i.e. support for neighbourhoods associations, and 
networks outside the group). 
 
Incomes and employment 
—  Employment policies, including public sector quotas (Malaysia, Sri Lanka, 
India) and requirement for balanced employment in the private sector (South 
Africa); 
—  Transfer payments: however, although there are many cases of age, disability 
and gender related transfers, no examples were identified of transfers 
according to ethnicity or religion or race.  
 
Two successful country examples—Malaysia and Northern Ireland—illustrate how 
affirmative action can contribute to reducing social and economic HIs, helping to bring 
about and support peace. 
Malaysia: a successful case of reducing economic and social HIs 
As is now well-known, in 1971, following anti-Chinese riots, the New Economic Policy 
was introduced, with the aim of securing national unity by a two prong approach: ‘to 
reduce and eventually eradicate poverty’; and ‘to accelerate the process of restructuring 
Malaysian society to correct economic imbalance so as to reduce and eventually 
eliminate the identification of race with economic function’ (Second Malaysian Plan 
1971-75). 
 
A variety of anti-poverty policies were adopted including policies to promote rural 
development and extend social services. As far as restructuring was concerned, the most 
significant policies: 
 
−  Aimed to expand Bumiputera share of capital ownership to 30 per cent. 
−  Aimed to settle 95 per cent of new lands on Malays. 
−  Introduced educational quotas for public institutions laid down, in line with 
population shares. 
−  Introduced credit policies which favoured Malays, with credit allocations and more 
favourable interest rates.   
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As Figures 1 and 2 and Table 2 show, the policies were effective in reducing the 
differentials, but not in eliminating them. The application of the policies was much 
weakened from the mid-1980s, and since then there has been little progress in changing 
HIs, except in professional employment which may reflect earlier educational policies. 
Efficiency does not seem to have been adversely affected, since economic growth was 
rapid over this period. Evidence suggests that intra-group inequality did not increase 
during the NEP, but actually lessened, with the Gini for Malay incomes (peninsular) 
falling from 0.488 in 1979 to 0.428 in 1988, while the Gini for Chinese incomes fell 
from 0.470 to 0.400 over the same period. The distribution of Indian incomes also 
became more equal (Hashim 1997). The political objective does seem to have been 
achieved, as no serious anti-Chinese riots have occurred since 1969, even in the 
aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis while there were serious anti-Chinese violence 
elsewhere (Indonesia and Thailand). From a political perspective, the Chinese were 
represented in government via the alliance (UMNO) which has ruled Malaysia since 
1955. However, most observers would concur that they had limited political power. 
 
Figure 1: Incomes in Malaysia 















Figure 2: Capital ownership in Malaysia 

































































Table 2: Professional employment in Malaysia 
  Share of total registered professionals as a ratio of population share, % 
 1970  1980  1990 1999 
Bumiputera 0.08  0.24  0.47  0.47 
Chinese 2.03  2.12  1.86  1.80 
Indian 2.91  2.18  1.65  1.94 
        
Standard deviation  1.45  1.10  0.75  0.81 
Source: Jomo (2001). 
Though widely criticized, the policies were accepted by the Chinese community 
probably because of the considerable economic opportunities they enjoyed, with rapidly 
growing incomes and continued differentials in their favour. The policies have also been 
criticized for leaving out the Indian community—although on average, they retained 
favourable differentials—and for the fact that the Bumiputera policy (sons of the soil) 
mainly favoured Peninsular Malays and not indigenous people in Sabah and Sarawak, 
such as the Orangi Asli. 
Northern Ireland 
In Northern Ireland, HIs have been large and persistent over all dimensions over a very 
long time period—indeed essentially since English Protestants first colonized Ireland in 
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. These sharp HIs—economic, social and political—
were an important factor behind the outbreak of violence in the 1970s. From the late 
1970s the British government and the European Union initiated policies to correct these 
inequalities. The success of these policies was probably one factor explaining why the 
Catholic community was prepared to stop violent action.  
 
By the end of the nineteenth century Protestants controlled the vast bulk of the 
economic resources of east Ulster—the best of its land, its industrial and financial 
capital, commercial and business networks, industrial skills (Ruane and Todd 1996: 
151). The division of the island, when the Republic of Ireland was created in 1922, 
ensured permanent political control and continued economic dominance by the 
Protestants in the province of Northern Ireland, where they formed the majority. 
Assessments indicate no narrowing of the gap between the communities from 1901 to 
1951, with Catholics disadvantaged at every level (Hepburn 1983). Unemployment 
rates, for example, were consistently more than twice the rate among Catholics than 
Protestants; educational qualifications were substantially worse. In fact, there was some 
worsening of the Catholic position over the first three-quarters of the twentieth century, 
with a rising proportion of unskilled workers among Catholics and a falling proportion 
among Protestants and the relative unemployment ratios also appear to have worsened 
over this period (Ruane et al. 1996). 
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Political inequalities were also large. For example, the Catholics with roughly 40 per 
cent of the population accounted for only 8 per cent of the membership of the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary (RUC), while devolution of power to the province meant that the 
majority Protestants were in permanent control. The consistency of the inequalities 
across political, economic and social dimensions—with most evidence suggesting little 
change in the first three-quarters of the twentieth century—provided fertile ground for 
the outbreak of the ‘troubles’ in the late 1960s. 
 
From the late 1970s, the British government introduced a series of measures that 
worked to reduce economic and social HIs. The introduction of two Fair Employment 
Acts in 1976 and 1989 greatly reduced employment discrimination; and housing and 
education policy was geared to reduce differentials. The policies had a significant 
impact on His (see Figures 3, 4, and 5). Inequality in access to higher education was 
eliminated by the 1990s; inequality in incomes was reduced; the housing inequality was 
significantly reduced; and the employment profile and unemployment rates became 
more equal; even the imbalance in recruitment to the RUC was slowly being reversed. 
According to one observer ‘It is unusual to find such a rate of social change within a 
generation. It is quite dramatic. In many areas Catholics have caught up with or 
surpassed Protestants’ (Osborne quoted by McKittrick 2004). 
 




Figure 4: The employment gap in Northern Ireland, men 
 
Note: Catholic share of labour force share minus Catholic share of jobs (in percentage points). 
Source: LFS 1992-99; Census of Population 1971, 1981, 1991 
Figure 5: Unemployment rates in Northern Ireland, men 
 
Note: Community differential in unemployment rates: Catholic rate minus Protestant rate (percentage 
points). 
Source: LFS 1992-99; Census of Population 1971, 1981, 1991 
 
The Good Friday Agreement embodied measures to correct political inequalities, such 
as power sharing and reform of the police to incorporate more Catholics. Police Acts of 
1998, 2000, 2003 were passed with the aim of achieving 50 per cent recruitment among 
Catholics (Osborne and Shuttleworth 2004).  
 
The correction of inequalities appears to have been effective in sustaining the peace 
process, especially among Catholics. Protestants, who lost by these corrections, 
continue to show more opposition to the process. There has been an exodus of young 
Protestants to Britain, and a recent report states that Protestants generally regard 
themselves as disadvantaged by the peace process, with 39 per cent believing they are 
worse off than six years ago. Whereas in 1996, 44 per cent of Protestants and 47 per 
cent of Catholics thought inter-community relationships were better than five years  
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previously, in 2003, only 25 per cent of Protestants and 33 per cent of Catholics did 
(University of Ulster 2003). 
Correcting social and economic HIs—a summary 
The survey of affirmative action shows that it often has some success in reducing HIs, 
but has rarely totally eliminated gaps—although in a few cases (e.g., Northern Ireland 
and Sri Lanka; see below) selected gaps were even reversed. Moreover, there is no 
evidence that the policies reduce efficiency, though careful evaluations are rare. In 
theory, there are reasons for expecting the efficiency impacts to have both negative and 
positive elements. On the negative side, there is the interference in normal competitive 
processes which might prevent resources being allocated according to their most 
efficient use; but on the positive side is the offset (or reduction) in discrimination which 
itself contributes to inefficient resource allocation, and should allow the greater 
exploitation of potential. The most systematic study of the efficiency impact has been 
with respect to US affirmative action towards blacks. Some studies show positive 
impact, while none show negative.8 In Malaysia, the high economic growth that 
accompanied the policies also suggest that the policies are highly unlikely to have had 
any substantial negative efficiency impact, and may have had positive impact.  

































It has been argued that while the policies reduce inter-group inequality they increase 
intra-group inequality. From an a priori perspective, this is not inevitable but depends 
on whether the policies mostly extend lower-income opportunities and services (e.g., 
unskilled employment; investment in poor regions; primary education) or mostly affect 
upper-income opportunities (professional and skilled employment; higher education). 
Systematic evidence on this is lacking. In the case of Malaysia, intra-group inequality 
                                                 
8 ‘the preponderance of evidence suggests that activity associated with equal employment and affirmative 
action policies is associated with small but significant gains in a range of blue-collar and white-collar 
occupations’; Simms (1995: 3) summarizing Badgett and Hartmann (1995).  
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fell during the decade when the policies were most effective. In South Africa, it is 
argued that intra-black inequality has risen since the policies were reduced. In both 
cases, of course, many other influences were simultaneously affecting income 
distribution (e.g., the anti-poverty policies in Malaysia; and the liberalization policies in 
South Africa) so the changes cannot be attributed to the affirmative policies alone.  
 
The possibility of adverse impact on efficiency and intra-group equity suggests that one 
should aim to design policies which tend by themselves (or in conjunction with other 
policies) to enhance efficiency and to improve income distribution. From an efficiency 
perspective, this might mean a greater emphasis on process reform and subsidies than 
quotas; and from an equity perspective, it would mean putting emphasis on employment 
and basic services, and infrastructure in poor regions.  
 
It should also be noted that even if the policies did reduce efficiency and worsen intra-
group income distribution, these effects would need to be weighed against their likely 
impact in reducing violence, which itself would have positive effect on growth and 
efficiency and poverty reduction. From this perspective a comparison of Malaysia’s 
post-1997 record with that of Indonesia is suggestive. Both suffered a similar economic 
shock, which was followed by a period of quite serious violence in the case of 
Indonesia. While Malaysia’s growth was slightly positive, taking the whole period 1997 
to 2003 (Figure 6) Indonesia’s growth rate was negative, on average, (GDP per capita 
falling by 5.3 per cent over the period).  
3.2  Political action  
Ensuring that each major group participates in political power is a critical requirement 
for sustained peace, since political exclusion is likely to generate the leadership which is 
essential for mobilization. Hence action is needed to reduce political HIs and to ensure 
that each group participates in political decision-making and power. Where one group 
dominates numerically in the population (e.g., in Sri Lanka; Northern Ireland; Rwanda), 
a Westminster majoritarian political system plus winner takes all ensures that minorities 
are excluded politically. Power sharing is not a natural consequence of the way many 
understand democracy.  
 
It should be emphasized that political participation can occur at many levels (central, 
regional, local), in different types of decision (defence, economic, social) and in 
different activities (army, police, civil service). Full political participation means that 
significant groups in the population participate across the board, and that their presence 
is not just nominal. There are many ways this can be promoted. Appendix Tables A.2 
and A.3 review a range of such policies which have been introduced in divided 
societies. Here we touch briefly on major aspects. 
 
—  A federal constitution: Where groups are mainly geographically separate a 
federal constitution can empower different groups. Nigeria is an example. The  
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Nigerian case also shows that the design of the federation is also an important 
factor, as the initial three-state constitution encouraged Biafran separatism. 
After the civil war the Federation was redesigned to encompass more states 
which straddled different ethnicities. 
—  The extent and nature of decentralization: This can contribute to power sharing 
in a similar way to federalism. This may have been one reason why Bolivia 
avoided conflict despite deep HIs. But it does not always work in the intended 
way. Decentralization can replace one set of power brokers by another, which 
may or may not diffuse group domination. For example, in a study in Northern 
Sumatra, Indonesia, mayoral election in Medan was achieved with the support 
of a group of ‘toughs’. The poor were not empowered: ‘land rights activists 
argue that local governments which are supposed to be accountable to local 
peoples have done little to resolve long standing land tenure disputes involving 
the peasantry; labour activists suggest that party linked militia have been 
involved in terrorising workers during labour disputes, while in the pay of local 
industrialists’ (Vedi Hadiz 2004: 715). Where groups are geographically 
concentrated, such decentralization may nonetheless give greater political 
power to previously underrepresented groups. But it can also lead to continued 
(or even greater) disempowerment for some (normally minority) groups within 
the decentralized areas, as is also the case with federalism (cf. Nigeria). 
—  The voting system: A proportional representation system gives more power to 
minorities, but even with proportional representation a majority can dominate 
decision-making unless one also adopts a power-sharing system in elected 
assemblies and government. Other voting systems (such as the alternative vote) 
can be designed to improve group representation. Such systems are rare in 
developing countries, although it is worth reporting that no country with 
proportional representation has had serious conflict. 
—  The nature of the elected assemblies: In a two-house, assembly, its possible to 
combine democratic representation in one house of the assembly with 
geographic (as in US) or group representation in the other. The voting system 
within assemblies can be designed to prevent a single group dominating (e.g., 
requiring a two-thirds majority), or veto powers.  
—  Seat reservation for particular groups: This has been adopted for the 
unscheduled castes and tribes in India (and in a number of cases for women).  
—  Job allocation within government: For example, there is provision for three 
presidents in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There can be formal or informal provisions 
for a fair share of political posts at every level: (i) presidential; (ii) cabinet; 
(iii) senior civil service; (iv) military, and (v) police. 
—  Citizenship rights: These can be comprehensive covering all who live in an 
area, or highly restrictive, requiring several generations of residence, or 
extending only to ‘blood’ ties with some ‘original’ inhabitants. By excluding  
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people from citizenship rights they may also be excluded from voting, or 
participation in government (as in Cote d’Ivoire). 
—  The nature of political parties: If unconstrained, political parties tend to 
become ‘ethnic’ in divided societies (Horowitz 1985). For this reason, 
multiparty elections often provoke violence (Snyder 2000; Stewart and 
O’Sullivan 1999). Policies towards political parties range from outlawing them 
altogether (as in Museveni’s Uganda) to requiring them to have multiethnic 
support (e.g., in Nigeria). 
—  Human rights protection: Strong protection of civil liberties and human rights 
does not ensure power-sharing. But it does limit the abuse of power. It 
obviously has an important role to play.   
This account has only touched on the many policies that can be used to ensure political 
participation of major groups. As with economic and social policies, there has been 
considerable experience in designing political systems to achieve inclusive and balanced 
political participation in sharply divided societies struggling to maintain peace and 
cohesion. Among developed countries, Belgium and Switzerland are prime examples. 
Many developing countries initially overcame these problems by one-party authoritarian 
regimes which suppressed dissent. But the political issues associated with multiethnic 
societies are coming to the fore with democratization. The recommended formula of 
majoritarian multiparty democracy is not adequate and post-conflict countries have 
struggled to find alternative more inclusive models. Nigeria, Fiji, Ethiopia and Malaysia 
are examples, each having modified their political systems as a consequence of political 
unrest. It is clear that policies to address political HIs need to accompany economic and 
social policies in post-conflict situations if renewed conflict is to be avoided.  
3.3 Cultural  policies 
Cultural policies can be an important aspect of group grievances and consequently of 
post-conflict policies—such policies aim to correct cultural exclusion and 
discrimination (e.g., policies towards language, religious ceremonies, religious or ethnic 
dress, national holidays and so on. Language has been a critical issue in many countries, 
including Sri Lanka and among the Kurds in Iraq. Ceremonies and symbols are also 
important, at least as triggers for conflict: the Orange parades in Northern Ireland and 
the site of religious buildings in India and Israel/Palestine are among many examples. 
Dimitrijevics (2004) argues that in peace negotiations policies towards such cultural 
aspects have been more important for promoting peace than either political or economic 
policies.  
4  Do current reconstruction policies include policies towards HIs? 
At a general level, it seems that concern with correcting HIs is not part of the policy mix 
advocated by major donors. On the economic side, reconstruction policies have been 
mainly addressed towards restoring the infrastructure and (re)establishing a market  
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economy, including the introduction of the normal package of liberal market reforms. 
On the political side, the emphasis has been on multi-party democracy and the ‘usual’ 
governance reforms, i.e. improved transparency and accountability. 
... [the] peace building ‘template’ has come to include concrete programs 
and projects such as civil society promotion, multi-party elections, 
constitutionalism, rule of law and minority rights, gender equality, good 
governance through transparency and accountability, economic 
liberalization, and security sector reform’. Tschirgi (2004: 14)9 
 
The World Bank Report, Breaking the Conflict Trap, argues that in general appropriate 
policy should be different in post-conflict countries from normal peacetime policies. In 
particular the Report argues for policies to help post-conflict countries sustain growth, 
to offset the impact of commodity price slumps, to increase transparency in natural 
resource rich economies, and to limit access to resources which finance conflict. It does 
not consider any policies towards HIs. Actual practice in post-conflict reconstruction is 
more telling than broad prescriptions.10 To assess this, I investigate two cases—
Mozambique and Guatemala—where HIs seem to have been an important factor behind 
the conflict. 
5  Reconstruction and HIs in Mozambique and Guatemala 
5.1 Mozambique 
Mozambique suffered a bitter civil war following independence. Although the war was 
ideological and geo-political with the socialist Frelimo government being attacked by 
the more conservative forces of Renamo with strong support from South Africa and 
some from the US, there were underlying regional and ethnic differences between the 
parties. There were also systematic inherited horizontal inequalities between these 
ethnicities/regions and the conflict was almost certainly partly due to the relative 
deprivation in the areas represented by Frelimo.  
 
More than ten years have followed since the 1992 peace agreement and several 
multiparty elections. Reconstruction efforts received strong international support, which 
                                                 
9 This broadly represents the thrust of the 1995 DAC Guidelines ‘Helping Prevent Violent Conflict’ 
which places it chief emphasis on the need for policy coordination; it emphasizes the need to incorporate 
local actors into decision making (including civil society), for gender balance. The importance of 
socioeconomic disparities is recognized, but not linked to ethnic dimensions, nor incorporated 
systematically into policy.  
10 Boyce (2002) presents a very useful survey of policies adopted in selected countries post-conflict, 
showing that they are little different from normal adjustment policies. He points to the need to raise 
taxation and expenditure post-conflict, and mentions disparities but says but says very little about policies 
towards them.   
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were rather successful from the perspective of growth and poverty reduction (albeit 
interrupted by natural disasters, including floods and drought). Yet the policies in no 
way addressed the underlying horizontal inequalities, which have persisted. The case 
illustrates how existing approaches to reconstruction often fail to incorporate an HI 
dimension into their thinking. Continued neglect of HIs may again undermine political 
stability. A fierce internal conflict between Frelimo and Renamo followed after 
Mozambique became independent in 1975. The division between these parties was 
primarily regional—with Frelimo being mainly a Southern party and Renamo for the 
most part representing the Centre. The North was divided between the two. This 
regional division also reflected ethnic divisions—Frelimo was supported by the 
Xitsonga (accounting for 24.1 per cent of Mozambique population) from the Southern 
region, and Renamo had Cisena (27 per cent of the population) and Ndau support from 
the central region– indeed Frelimo has been described as an ‘Ndau project’. A UN-
negotiated peace agreement ended the fighting in 1992, and multiparty general elections 
followed in 1994 and 1999—in a first past the post-system Frelimo won each election 
easily. 
 
Although the civil war had strong ideological elements and was also due to extensive 
external intervention, ‘ethnicity, particularly the perceived dominance of state power by 
southerners’ played an important role in shaping Mozambique’s civil conflict’. 
(Manning 2002: 44).  
 







% of households with:  electricity  19.6  8.3  2.36 
 television  13.4  3.1  4.32 
 refrigerator  12.1  2.4  5.04 
% women attended school  68.2  55.1  1.17 
% husbands with ‘modern’ occupation  24.6  22.4  1.10 
IMR   84.0  111.9  1.33* 
% children with health card  79.2  67.2  1.18 
Note: *inverse of ratio. 
Source: Østby (2003). 
Table 4: The party split in Mozambique’s 1994 elections 
Region  % of seats won by Frelimo  Ratio of Frelimo to Renamo 
North 50  1.0 
Centre 32  0.47 
South 92  11.5 
Aggregate seats  129F:112R  1.2 
Source: Manning (2002: 171).  
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The coincidence of pre-existing regional disparities in economic 
development, Frelimo’s tendency to place government officials in 
positions away from their home areas (and especially to put southerners 
in positions of authority in the center and the north), along with the 
disastrous social and economic consequences of the combination of 
instantaneous decolonization and transformative socioeconomic policy, 
made for a readily mobilizable constituency with common problems that 
displaced Frelimo former leaders could link to ethno-regional bias 
(Manning 2002: 85). 
 
The conflict, therefore, was able to capitalize ‘on existing grievances within 
Mozambique. Foremost among these were a sense of ethnic and regional domination 
(by southern groups against the center and center-north)’ (Manning 2002: 38). 
Economic and social horizontal inequalities in Mozambique—whether expressed in 
ethnic or regional terms—had been entrenched during the colonial period, and were 
evident in the immediate post-war situation. In Table 3, these HIs are estimated by the 
ratios of Xitsonga to Cisena resources and consumption. As can be seen Xitsonga 
(southerners) consistently outperform Xistongas from the centre.  
 
Post-conflict political divisions continued to reflect the war-time divisions, albeit in a 
peaceful electoral way. Political support for the two parties has consistently followed 
regional lines. In 1994, each party polled over 75 per cent of their votes in heartland 
areas. The Frelimo government is supported by the south and part of the north. and the 
opposition leadership comes mainly from the centre and the north.  
 
The post-conflict political system involves a directly elected president, with 
considerable powers, including the appointment of the cabinet. The legislature is elected 
by proportional representation—this is nonetheless dominated by Frelimo who get 
support from more than half the population. To the extent that that support remains solid 
because of the way ethnic groupings vote, Renamo and its supporters will continue to 
lack power. The Frelimo government has used its position to monopolize formal power: 
for example, the power of traditional leaders, who tend to support Renamo, has been 
sharply reduced. The President refused to appoint Renamo nominated governors for 
central provinces which Renamo had won electorally both in 1994 and 1999. As a 
Frelimo party leader noted, ‘The leadership of the government was with people from the 
south…’ (quoted in Manning 2002: 47). The situation is reflected in complaints from 
Renamo supporter that Nampula was neglected: ‘it is a superiority complex of the south 
over the north’ (quoted in Manning 2002: 34) ‘what we want is that tribalism, 
humiliation and segregation of our people … be stopped’.  
 
In the post-conflict era, both political and economic/social HIs continued, with no 
attempts to correct them which may partly reflect this political domination, although 
aid-donors have huge power accounting for three-quarters of government expenditure.  
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Post-conflict reconstruction policies included the adoption of IFI-sponsored structural 
adjustment programmes and considerable amounts of bi- and multilateral aid to support 
reconstruction (see Brück 2001; Addison 2003). HIs were not considered explicitly in 
these policies. 
 
The regional distribution of post-war expenditure gives an indication of whether HIs 
were taken into account in post-conflict policies. A systematic bias favouring the South 
can be observed (Table 5). Southern households received considerably above average 
infrastructural benefits of every kind, and the centre did worst, apart from school 
building where it did a better than the north. Data for aid distribution (which financed 
much of this infrastructure) also showed a strong bias towards the south. 1997. Average 
per capita aid disbursements for 1995-97 were US$18.5 in the north, US$71.87 in the 
centre and US$103.98 in the south (UNDP 1998). 
 
Table 5: Per cent of households in villages benefiting from rehabilitation or 
construction of infrastructure post-war 
 Schools  Health  infrastructure  Roads 
  
% 










As % of 
national 
average 
North  16 0.76  10  111.1  23 1.44 
Centre  20 0.95  7  0.78  11 0.69 
South  37 1.76  14 1.56  25 1.56 
Source: Heltberg et al. (2004) from 1996-97 survey. 
Table 6: Regional growth rates, 1996-2000 
    Relative to national average 
 
 
Annual growth rate GDP, 1996-2000, % 
 1996-99  1996-2000* 
North 8.5    1.06  1.04 
Centre 6.0    0.88  0.73 
South 9.5    1.07  1.16 
Note: *south and centre affected by floods, 2000. 
Source: UNDP (2001). 
 
One estimate suggests that the centre received just 66 per cent of the average benefits 
from health and education (1996-97), the north 71 per cent, the south excluding Maputo 
89 per cent and Maputo 533 per cent (Helberg et al. 2004). This seems to have 
continued, with the north and the south expanding their overall share of executed 
provincial expenditure according to the 2003 PRSP. There was also an imbalance in 
growth rates, as shown in Table 6. The Mozambique case shows how little HIs are taken 
into account in current reconstruction efforts—in this case, either with respect to politics  
  23
or economic and social reconstruction. Despite this there has been little threat of the 
resumption of war, although there have been occasional clashes (such as in November 
2000). This is probably for several reasons. First, despite imbalances high growth rates 
were recorded in all areas, and all areas enjoyed improved infrastructure. Hence the 
imbalances were less provocative than they would have been in a context of economic 
stagnation. Second, external support for conflict disappeared. And third, it seems that 
some elite bargaining takes place in private providing economic opportunities to the 
leaders of the otherwise powerless opposition.11 Nonetheless, continued political and 
economic HIs may threaten future stability, particularly if the economic success comes 
to an end.  
5.2  Post-conflict in Guatemala12 
In Guatemala, sharp HIs have long been evident between indigenous peoples and the 
European and mixed population, and were an important element in provoking and 
sustaining the long civil war in Guatemala. Indigenous people account for at least 43 per 
cent of the population, but boundaries are uncertain and other estimates are higher. 
Large HIs emerged historically from the colonial experience, and have endured; e.g., for 
literacy, 1989, the indigenous rate was 10.2 per cent, and the non-indigenous, 76 per 
cent. According to a UNDP study of Guatemala, there are significant disparities in 
levels of development between the country’s 22 administrative departments with the 
departments, where most of the country’s Maya indigenous population is concentrated, 
all in the low human development (HDI under 0.500) category, while Guatemala City, 
where non-indigenous people are concentrated, is in the high human development 
category. Over three-quarters of the indigenous people live in poverty compared with 41 
per cent of the non-indigenous; indigenous people account for 58 per cent of the poor 
and 72 per cent of the extreme poor. Inequality in land ownership is extreme (Figure 7). 
In 1979, 2.1 per cent of holdings accounted for 64.5 per cent of the agrarian land (a 
worsening compared with the 1950s). These economic inequalities were accompanied 
by extreme political inequalities with power concentrated in the hands of the non-
indigenous population. 
 
The historical causes of the long civil war relate to the ‘exclusionary, racist, 
authoritarian and centralist characteristics of the state, economy and Guatemalan 
society’ (CEH 1999: 81, quoted in Caumartin). In a coup in 1954 a reformist regime 
was overthrown (with the support of the US, sections of the military and the elite). 
Subsequently, guerrilla resistance to the new regime emerged, led by non-indigenous 
rebel soldiers. The initial movement was rapidly suppressed, but new ones emerged, 
mostly with non-indigenous leadership, but with strong indigenous support. There 
                                                 
11 ‘Renamo seeks to gain outside the formal system what it cannot win through formal competition’ 
(Manning 2002: 215).  
12 This section draws heavily on Caumartin (2004).  
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followed a brutal campaign of state terror, with indigenous people being the main 
victims. Six hundred and twenty-two separate massacres were recorded by the UN 
sponsored truth commission. The war finally came to an end through a negotiated peace 
agreement between the government and the guerrilla umbrella movement. It was 
negotiated over nine years in three rounds of talks, ending in 1996. Altogether 17 
separate accords were agreed. Of these, the first six were mainly concerned with 
procedures for securing peace; subsequently, there were three agreements on human 
rights, one specifically related to indigenous peoples and one establishing a commission 
to investigate human rights abuses; two of the agreements concerned socioeconomic 
issues, one related to resettlement and one to the agrarian question; the remainder 
covered constitutional issues and peace-making.  
 
From our perspective the two most relevant accords are the Agreement on the Socio-
Economic aspects and the Agrarian situation and the Agreement on the Identity and 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (AIRI). The main provisions of the first were to increase 
tax revenue in order to support increased social expenditure; to introduce a register for 
land tenure and a trust fund to buy underused land for redistribution to tenant farmers; 
and conflict resolution mechanisms for land disputes. Each of these provisions in 
principle should help correct HIs, the first HIs in public entitlements to social services, 
and the second in land—both very serious aspects of HIs and exclusion in Guatemala.  
 
The AIRI also potentially involved substantial correction of HIs (including cultural 
aspects). It included recognition of the identity of indigenous peoples, elimination of 
discrimination against them and the guarantee of the cultural, civil, political and social 
and economic rights of indigenous peoples. There was a commitment to ratify the ILO 
convention 169, the most extensive international convention for the protection of 
indigenous peoples rights; and the establishment of several joint commissions (of 
government and indigenous representatives) to develop specific proposals. These 
commissions include educational reform and cultural diversity, making indigenous 
languages official, protecting indigenous religious sites, political reform, participation 
and culture , indigenous women, indigenous peoples’ land rights and customary law. As 
Caumartin notes, ‘if adequately implemented, the AIRI provide the blueprint for a 
radical transformation of the Guatemalan state as well as a new starting point for inter-
ethnic relations’ (2004: 58). 
 
Nonetheless, many considered the agreement did not go far enough in this direction. 
However, its implementation proved even weaker. A political campaign against the 
agreements developed among conservative forces, with strong media support. It was 
argued that the agreement had been ‘forced’ on Guatemala by external forces. A 
referendum on the agreements was held in 1998. The ‘no’ campaign argued that 
approval would ‘convert Guatemala into an indigenous state, marginalising the non-
indigenous’, that ‘citizens would be divided and that the indigenous would possess more 
rights than other citizens’ (Liga-Pro Patria leaflet cited in Caumartin 2004: 62); that non  
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indigenous would lose their jobs; and that Guatemala might become ‘balkanized’. In the 
referendum, the ‘nos’ won by 55 per cent to 45 per cent on a poll of only 18.6 per cent 
of the electorate. A breakdown of voting patterns shows that indigenous districts voted 
overwhelmingly in favour, and non-indigenous ones against (Jonas 2000). 
 
Subsequently, according to Caumartin ‘most accords bar those that dealt with the strict 
mechanics of the cease fire have either floundered or been subjected to substantial 
delays during the implementation phase. Key sections  …  are currently in limbo 
(agrarian issues, indigenous rights, the redefinition of the mandate of the armed forces 
and the overhaul of the tax system)’ (2004: 63-64). A record of peace-monitoring 
indicators shows some progress, but many targets have not been met (Table 7). 
 
While progress has been made on education (spending and outcomes), tax revenue has 
risen less than targeted and so has GDP, so that government revenue is well below that 
targeted. Health expenditure has risen less than targeted and health outcomes are 
substantially below target. Overall, however, government expenditure on human 
development has risen from 3.1 per cent of GDP to 5 per cent from 1997 to 2001, and 
some key services (electricity, education, access to water) have been targeted towards 
Mayan groups (UNDP 2001). The HDI has risen for both indigenous and non-
indigenous between 1989 and 2002, and there has been some narrowing of the gap 
between indigenous and non-indigenous (from 0.72 per cent for indigenous as a 
percentage of non-indigenous to 0.81 per cent). 
 
A key failure was that land reform was not tackled. In 1979, the smallest farms 
accounted for 88 per cent of the number of farms but just 16.2 per cent of the land. The 
number of small farms had risen to 92.1 per cent by 2003 and their share of land to 21.9 
per cent. On average large farms had 145 times the land per farm of small farms in 
1979. There was a slight improvement by 2003, but large farms were still on average 
131 times the size of small farms. 
Table 7: Selected peace monitoring indicators in Guatemala 
Target  Base 1995  Target 2000  Actual 2000 
Growth rate, % p.a.  6  6  3.3 
Tax revenues, % of GDP  7.6  12  9.6 
Education spending, % of GDP  1.6  2.5  2.5 
Health spending, % of GDP  0.9  1.3  1.1 
Military spending, % GDP  1  0.7  0.7 
Judiciary spending, % GDP  0.2  0.3  0.5 
Literacy rate, %  64.2  70  68.9 
IMR, per 1,000 life births  40  20  40-45 
Maternal mortality rate, per 100,000 births 97-270*  48.5  190-270* 
Note: * First figure, World Bank (2000); second figure, WHO. 
Source: World Bank/Guapa (2003: 39).  
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The Guatemalan case is very different from that of Mozambique. In the Guatemalan 
case, atypically, some of the deep problems related to HIs were included in the initial 
agreements. Even so if the agreements were fully to tackle HIs they would have needed 
to be interpreted with progressive imagination and determination. In the event, however, 
strong political resistance, and apathetic efforts on the part of the government meant that 
progress was mixed, although probably sufficient to prevent conflict breaking out again 
on the part of the indigenous community. Since much of the responsibility for the 
conflict was in fact that of the elite/military in their vicious attacks on the indigenous 
communities, ironically the rather limited progress towards improving HIs may in fact 
have contributed to peace, by giving this elite little grounds for overturning the 
government as they had done before.  
 
Figure 7: Land distribution in Guatemala 
Lorenz curves: land distribution
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In general, the elite have done extremely well out of the peace accords, politically as 
well as economically: the military have been dislodged from power and the non-military 
elite is again a dominant political actor—for example in the Arzu government of 1996-
2000; and the 2004 Berger administration. Consequently, the elite have a powerful 
incentive not to overthrow the government. However, insecurity remains very high, 
taking the form of high of very high levels of criminality, involving one of the highest 
homicide rates in the world which indicates that while the accords may have ended the 
civil war, violent conflicts remain a dominant characteristic of Guatemalan society. 
Long standing high HIs may also play an important role in these new patterns of 
conflict and violence.  
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6 Conclusions 
This paper has reviewed policies appropriate for correcting HIs in post-conflict 
countries. It has emphasized that policies need to correct political as well as economic 
and social HIs, although which policies are appropriate depends on the context. In 
general, policies to correct economic and political HIs do not seem to feature in most 
post-conflict policy recommendations, nor in practice. It must be re-emphasized that 
these are not the only policies needed. Policies to assist the resumption of economic 
growth and the reconstruction of economic and social infrastructure are also needed as 
well as policies to promote demobilization. Particular emphasis is needed on promoting 
unskilled employment, since lack of employment among young men is a common 
feature of conflict economies, a factor which predisposes to conflict. 
 
I would conclude with three cautions. The first is the often argued point that affirmative 
actions tend to ‘entrench’ ethnicity. It should be pointed out that this is most likely to be 
a feature of policies involving targets and quotas, not those related to process and 
Human Rights, so this is an argument for prime emphasis on the latter type of policies. 
But there are places where HIs are so deep that more positive policies involving targets 
etc. are required. In practice, such policies are generally required in situations where are 
ethnicities are already entrenched. If accompanied by cultural and educational policies 
to promote multiethnic cohesion, they need not entrench ethnic consciousness further 
than it is already. In Malaysia, for example, while it has been argued that ethnicity has 
been entrenched by the policies, inter-marriage has remained high and collaborative 
ventures across ethnic lines have increased. In Malaysia, also the policies are being 
phased out as it is considered that their major objectives have been achieved. 
Continuous review and a time limited approach is generally desirable. 
















































The second caution is that in certain circumstances the policies themselves may provoke 
violence. Indeed, it has been argued that this was the case in Sri Lanka. Colonial 
preferences had given the minority Tamil community disproportionate presence in 
government and higher education. To counter this, the Sinhalese majority introduced 
some severe measures to reverse the position, including making Sinhalese the national 
language and that of government, and introducing strict quotas on university entrance. 
There were also discriminatory land policies. These measures had the effect of reversing 
the previous dominance of Tamils in government and substantially reducing their 
advantages in the universities (see Figure 8). High levels of unemployment among the 
educated youth, virtually no prospect of political power in a majoritarian system (even 
with proportional representation which was eventually introduced) provided an 
incentive for young educated Tamils to lead a violent separatist rebellion 
(Sriskandarajah 2000). 
 
The case powerfully shows the need to be cautious in introducing policies to correct HIs 
so as not to provoke violent reaction from those who are losing some privileges. 
However, in this case, other factors were also present—including provocative language 
policies and high levels of unemployment among educated youths. Elsewhere 
inequalities have been moderated if not reversed without provoking violent reaction 
(e.g., in Trinidad and Tobago)13 in addition to the cases of Northern Ireland and 
Malaysia mentioned above.  
 
The third caution is illustrated by the example of Guatemala. Where the privileged 
dominate the political system, they may not be willing to implement corrective policies, 
whatever the international pressure to do so. In such situations, there is little the 
international community can do, other than through their own aid budgets. The 
implication again is that action to correct political HIs may need to precede economic 
action—but of course this is easier to say than to do, though when conflicts come to an 
end the peace negotiations provide an occasion in which comprehensive political 
participation and economic balance can and should be discussed. 
 
While then policies to correct HIs may meet difficulties, the more the consideration of 
group inequality becomes part of the norms of policy-making in peace-time as well as 
post-conflict situations, the more likely that action towards HIs will become part of 





                                                 
13 Sriskandarajah (2005).  
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Table A1: Examples of economic/social affirmative action 
     Consequences 
 








Whites     54%
Blacks and 
mixed race  45%
(mostly mixed race) 
Income/education/empl. 
favoured whites, plus many 
other inequalities. 1960-88 
worsening HIs. 
Some measures in 1990s. 
From 2001, reservation of 
proportion of govt. job 
training, government 
employment, university 
places, mainly favouring 
blacks. 
 
Too soon to tell, but could 
be at expense of mixed 
race. 
Too soon to tell   Fuzzy group boundaries  Programmes presented 








Indigenous Fijans   51%
Indo-Fijans 43%
Average income of Indo-
Fijans above indigenous; 
but poverty worse among 
Indo-Fijans.  
Fijans dominate govt 
employment and land 
ownership.  
Indo-Fijans dominate private 
sector. 
 
Measures favour  
indigenous Fijans,  
including, restrictions on 
land ownership, loan 
schemes, equity schemes, 
support for small enterprise, 
reservation of some sectors, 
privatization.  
Not much evidence.  
Sharp HIs remain in some 
areas (e.g. corporate 
management). 
Agreement that have 
enriched indigenous 
elite/middle class.  
Very slow economic growth.
  An element behind 
successive coups whenever 
Indo-Fijans get power 
because fear elimination of 
programmes. 
Together with political 
situation, responsible for 








SCs   16%
STs   8.5%
OBCs   na 
Backward groups 
substantially below  
average in incomes, 
consumption, land 
ownership, education, etc. 
Variety of educational,  
land and public sector job 
reservations.  
Evidence of small  
positive impact on public 
investment, and incomes. 
Large improvements in 
education. 
Has permitted a small 
segment of backward  
castes to move into middle 
class, but exclusion and 
abject poverty remains for 
most. No evidence of 
negative efficiency impact. 
Difficult to assess how far 
improvements are due to 
programmes and how far  
to ‘modernization’ and 
growth. 
Has to be assessed 
together with strong political 
programmes. May have 
entrenched rather than 
reduced caste differences. 
Triggered riots in Bihar, 
1978; and several times in 
Gujerat in 1980s. General 
rise in violence against SCs 















Chinese   30%
Indians   8% 
Incomes of Chinese more 
than 2 times Bumiputeras, 
1970; and Indians 75% 
more. 
Range of measures, 
including education, land 
ownership, govt 
employment, share 
ownership, to improve 
Bumiputera position 
Reduction in HIs in 
education, incomes, 
corporate ownership, but 




May have increased intra-
Bumiputera inequality—
although not much 
evidence. Inequality overall 
reduced. Accompanied by 
very high growth.  
  No recurrence of anti-
Chinese riots of 1969 
including in the 1997 crisis 
when such riots occurred in 
Indonesia.  











  Black Africans  95%
Whites     5%  
Very large HIs on all 
dimensions at 
independence (1990) 
Action on employment,  
land, loans, education 
Improvements in public 
employment. Much less 
elsewhere. 
Black middle class  
benefited most. 














  NZ European        74.5%
Maori   9.7%
Significant HIs in every 
dimension 
Support for Maori business 
and skills; and education. 
Improvement in HIs in 
employment and education. 
Gaps much lower than in 
Canada or Australia. 



















Catholics    44%
 
Catholics in worse position 
than Protestants in jobs, 
education, housing, police 
From 1976 successive  
fair Employment Acts/ 
Orders and other 
government action  
applying to private as well 
as public sector. 
Reduction in HIs in all 
dimensions, although gaps 
remain.  
Share of Catholics in 
‘monitored’ private sector 
employment rose from 35% 
(1990) to 41% (2002). 
Bigger improvement in 
public sector.  
In education Catholics 
overtaking Protestants. 
 
Poverty levels above the 
UK, worse for Catholics 
Vertical inequality high. 
  Narrowing HIs likely to be 
behind peace process. 
But Protestants increasingly 
resentful; and argue that 
they are discriminated 
against which may present 














  Black Africans  73%
Coloured     9%
Whites     14%
At end of apartheid, huge 
HIs in incomes, assets, 
employment, education, 
land. 
Action in employment, 
assets, education. 
Some improvement in HIs, 
but large differentials 
remain.  
Most improvement in  
public sector employment. 
Increased intra-black 
inequality. 
Unemployment and poverty 
levels among blacks very 
high. 
Dominant market model 
restricts effectiveness of 
action, especially on assets.
Black/white political 
relations appear good. 
High levels of criminality. 
Potential political problems 














Sinhalese   74%
Tamils     19%
Moslems      7%
Colonial power favoured 
Tamils in education  
and civil service.  
Average incomes of  
Tamils a bit higher than 
Singhalese 
Action on education and  
civil service (incl. requiring 
Sinhalese language to be 
used).  
State sponsored settlement 
of Sinhalese in land 
previously occupied by 
Tamils.  
 
HIs changed sharply.  
In civil service employment 
now favoured Sinhalese. 
Incomes of Sinhalese rose 
and Tamils fell, with former 
exceeding latter 
  Situation exacerbated  
by slow growth in 
employment. 
Reaction of Tamils to  
action was major factor 
behind civil war, and Tamil 
demands for independence 














  Whites   82%
Blacks     13%
Large HIs in incomes, 
education, health, assets, 
etc.  
Action in education, 
employment and housing 
Small reduction in His  Increase in intra-black 
inequality.  
No evidence of negative 
efficiency impact, from 
numerous studies, and 
some found positive effects 
  Black riots (high incidence in 
1970s) have stopped. 
Political and legal reaction 
from whites, challenging 
action. 
Notes: SCs = Scheduled castes. STs = Scheduled tribes. OBCs = Other backward castes. 
Sources: 
Brazil: Guillebeau (1999), Silva (1992), and Wood and Lovell (1992).  
Fiji: UNDP (1997), Horsecroft (2002), Barr (2001), Walsh (2000), Reddy et al. (2001), Chand (1997), and Ratuva (2002).  
India: Mandelsohn and Vicziany (1998), Alexander (2003), Duflo (no date), Banerjee and Somanathan (2001), Jauch (1998), World Bank (2002), Pande (2003), UNDP (no date), 
Mendelsohn and Vicziany (1998), Galanter (1984), Parry (1999), Jain and Ratnam (1994), and Seenraine (1996).  
Malaysia: Yusof (2001).  
Namibia: World Bank (1991), Jauch (1998), and Melber (2003).  
Northern Ireland: ILO (2003), Alexander and Jacobsen (1999), and Darby (1997).  
South Africa: Eide et al. (1992), Alexander and Jacobsen (1999), Gove (2000), Amos and Scott (1996), Drogin (1996), Collins (1994), and Schultz and Mwabu (1998).  
Sri Lanka: Sowell (1990), and Sriskandarajah (2000).  
United States: Holzer and Neumark (1998), Donohue and Heckman (1994), Badgett et al. (1997), and Darity, Dietrich and Gulkey (1997). 
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Mixed or other   11% 
bilingual Federal 




Mainly ethnic  Fixed ratios  De facto on  
big issues  
(2/3 majority) 




















  Serb                  37.1% 
Bosniak             48% 
Croat                 14.3% 















Power-sharing De  facto  ‘Equitable 
representation’ 






















to use own 
language 




 to secession. 
Majoritarian, 
boundaries drawn 
on ethnic lines. 





of ethnicities at each level 
of govt.  
  Aim for  
proportional 
representation in  
all branches of 
govt. 
1995 constitution 
designed to avoid 
conflict, after long 
Eritrea war for 
independence.  










  Akan (fragmented)   49.1% 
Mole Dagbani  16.5% 
Ewe   12.7% 
Ga     8%  
English Unitary  with 




Majoritarian Ethnic  parties 
prohibited 
No formal arrangements- 
informal balance 








Hindu                  81.3%  
(SCs & STs            24.5%) 
Muslim                 12% 
Hindi Federal 
28 states and  
7 union territories 
Majoritarian Some  national; 
some ethnic 
Quotas for SCs and STs in 
state legislatures and lower 
house of parliament, and 
some reservations for 
women in village 
panchayats women, not 
Moslems.  
Token representation of 
Moslems.  
SCs and STs not 
represented at high levels.
 
No  Quotas for STs and 
SCs in civil service, 
but level not 
specified. 




















  Bumiputeras      62%
Chinese            27.8%
Indians              9.6%
Bahasa 
Melayu 






Mainly ethnic.   Ethnic corporatism, 
assured by national 
coalition (Barisan national) 
with Malays dominating 
through UMNO  










Hausa              21%
Yoruba              20%
Igbo            ~17%
English Federation,  with 
increasing number  
of states (36) 
reducing likelihood  
of conflict. 






Federal character  
principle requires some 
representation from across 
country 
Informal only  Federal character 
means 
representation  
from over the 
country, but over 
representation of 




Many relatively minor 
conflicts. No national 
















German             73.4%
French            20.5%











Power sharing  Veto via 
referenda 
Shared.  No conflict  Women only 
recently 
enfranchised 
Notes: SCs = Scheduled castes (in India). STs = Scheduled tribes (in India). UMNO = United Malays National Organization. 
Source: UNRISD (2004), Ukiwo (2004), Htun (2003), The Federal Elements of the 1995 Ethiopian Constitution. 
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Appendix Table A3: Other countries with some political affirmative action 
Country Ethnicity  Affirmative  action  History of violent conflict 
Bhutan Bhote  50% 
ethnic Nepalese 35% 
indigenous or migrant tribes 
15%. 
Lamaistic Buddhist 75% 
Indian- and Nepalese-
influenced Hinduism 25% 
 
10/150 seats reserved for 
Buddhists  
Some border conflicts with 
India because Maoist 
Assam separatists located 
on border 







2 seats for Afro-
Colombians;  
3 seats for Indians in 
Senate out of 102 seats 
Long-standing conflict over 
land. 
Croatia Croat  89.6% 
Serb 4.5% 
 
Seats reserved for ethnic 
minorities  
Fighting for independence 
from Yugoslavia, 1991-5. 
Cyprus   Greek 85.2% 
Turkish 11.6% 
Seats reserved for Turks, 
Maronite, Roman Catholic 
and Goumenian minorities, 
but only Greek seats filled.
 
Conflict between Greeks 
and Turks for control from 
1974. Island divided. 
Ethiopia Oromo  40% 
Amhara and Tigre 32% 
Others 28% 
 
22/117 seats reserved for 
minorities 
Revolutionary war ended 
1991. Eritrea boundary war 
ended 2000.  
Jordan  Sunni Muslim 92% 
Christian 6% 
 
12/110 reserved for 
Christians 
None 
Lebanon  Muslim 70% (including 
Shi’a, Sunni, Druze, 




Quotas for particular groups 
for 101/128. 




Country Ethnicity  Affirmative  action  History of violent conflict 
Mauritius Indo-Mauritian  68% 
Creole 27% 
Hindu 52% 
Christian 28.3% (Roman 
Catholic 26%, Protestant 
2.3%) 
Muslim 16.6% 
8/70 for minorities.  None 
New 
Zealand  




7/120 for Maoris  None 





8/83 for minorities  5 year Tuareg insurgency 
ended 1995. Several coups 
subsequently. 
Pakistan  Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtun 
(Pathan), Baloch, Muhajir 
 
10/342 of Lower House 
reserved for minorities 
Recurring conflicts 




Venezuela  European and (small) 
indigenous population 
 
3 seats reserved for Indians None 
Source: Htun (2003), CIA (World Fact Book). 
 